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eral Reserve Bank of
Kansas City), Decem-
ber 1992, pp. 15-32. 
2 The banks also must
meet several other 
criteria which are ex-
plained in more detail
in Spong and Shoen-
hair, “Performance of
Banks,” pp. 15-16.
For example, in order
to get meaningful per-
formance measures
for before and after 
acquisition, both stud-
ies exclude failing
and failed bank 
acquisitions.
 The Spong and
Shoenhair study also
included banks ac-
quired on an inter-
state basis in 1985.
The present study,
however, had to ex-
clude this group of
banks, because it did
not contain enough
banks to permit a
separate analysis of
strong and weak per-
formers.
Interstate ownership of banks is now a
common element across many U.S. bank-
ing markets. Interstate banking, more-
over, is gaining further impetus from
recent federal legislation and the general
trend toward consolidation in banking.
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, for 
instance, replaces the wide variety of state
laws that have governed interstate entry,
and it allows banking organizations to 
acquire banks in any state as of Septem-
ber 29, 1995. This act also will allow
banks to branch interstate through merg-
ers, beginning June 1, 1997, unless indi-
vidual states choose to adopt alternative
legislation.
As interstate banking continues, the per-
formance and success of the banks that
are acquired will be the key factor that
determines how much consolidation will
occur and which organizations will be the
major interstate participants. Banking
organizations that can operate newly 
acquired banks successfully will clearly
have a strong advantage and the investor
support for further expansion. On the
other hand, organizations with weak per-
forming acquisitions are likely to face a 
variety of constraints in making sub-
sequent acquisitions and may even 
become acquisition targets themselves.
In a study of banks acquired interstate in
the years from 1985 to 1987, Spong and
Shoenhair found that the typical acquisi-
tion performed in much the same manner
as banks remaining under in-state owner-
ship.
1 However, a considerable range in
performance existed across these acquisi-
tions and some were far more successful
than others. This study reexamines the
same group of banks in order to identify
the strategies and characteristics that
distinguish the better performing acquisi-
tions from those with weaker perform-
ance. The strategies leading to successful
acquisitions will be of obvious importance
to banking organizations pursuing inter-
state expansion and will help point out
many of the factors bankers must address
when entering new markets. Actions that
have led to weak performance should also
be of interest to bankers and bank super-
visors in identifying the potential pitfalls
in interstate expansion.
This study begins with a discussion of the
criteria used to divide the acquired banks
into strong and weak performers. Sub-
sequent sections examine the basic strate-
gies, characteristics, and challenges
reflected in the interstate acquisitions,
and their possible contribution to suc-
cessful or weak banking performance.
Among the topics covered in these sec-
tions are lending and other asset strate-
gies, income and expense characteristics
and strategies, and several acquisition 
factors, such as the prices paid for inter-
state acquisitions. 
Characteristics of the acquired banks
To be considered for this study, a bank
must be a full service bank with a normal
range of banking operations, and it must
have been acquired on an interstate 
basis in either 1986 or 1987.
2 A total of
169 banks met these conditions. These
banks had an average asset size in the
$500 to $600 million range, as measured
after their acquisition, and they were





are economists in the
Policy and Special
Projects Department
of the Division of
Bank Supervision
and Structure.To place the acquired banks into strong
and weak performance categories, this
study takes each bank’s earnings record
after acquisition and compares it to that
of a group of peer banks remaining under
in-state ownership. For each acquired
bank, the appropriate peer bank statis-
tics are a composite of all full service
banks remaining under in-state owner-
ship that have similar size and location
characteristics.3 These peer bank com-
parisons allow a bank’s performance to
be adjusted for general industry trends
and local economic conditions and
should thus provide a more accurate pic-
ture of its overall success. Because the
1986 acquisitions have had one more
year of post-acquisition experience com-
pared to the 1987 acquisitions, the fol-
lowing analysis also divides the acquired
banks into two separate groups based on
a bank’s year of acquisition.
The initial test for setting up strong and
weak performance groups entails a com-
parison of an acquired bank’s return on
average assets to that of its peer banks
(i.e., ROAA for the acquired bank minus
the ROAA for its peer group). To be in the
strong performance category, an acquired
bank must have a return relative to peer
banks in both 1988 and 1989 that exceeds
the median value for its entire acquisition
group.
4 Weak performers are
those with relative returns in
both 1988 and 1989 that
fall below the median value
for the entire acquisition
group. This first criterion
thus requires banks to have
maintained a consistent
level of performance over a
period of years. 
Second, to be classified as a
strong performer, a bank
must further demonstrate a
rising trend after acquisition
in its relative return on aver-
age assets.5 Weak perform-
ers, on the other hand, must
show a falling trend. Conse-
quently, strong or weak performance is
not only based on earnings levels, but
is also determined by whether a bank
shows a relative improvement or deterio-
ration in performance after its acquisi-
tion.
Ninety of the acquired banks meet both
performance criteria, and Table 1 shows
a breakdown of these banks by the year
of their acquisition and ROAA perform-
ance category.
6 A nearly equal number of
banks are present in the strong and weak
performance groups for both acquisition
years.
The earnings trends within the perform-
ance groups generally reflect the selec-
tion criteria used to construct the
groups, and substantial differences are
apparent between the strong and weak
banks (Chart 1). Although the strong and
weak performance groups both began
with essentially the same average ROAAs
as peers, the average ROAA of the weak
performers had declined to at least 50 
basis points below peer banks by the sec-
ond year after acquisition. Strong per-
formers, in contrast, had achieved average
ROAAs at least 25 basis points above
their peers. For the 1986 acquisition 
group, the divergence between strong
and weak performers widened further in
Number of acquired banks by year of acquisition 





Strong 21 23 44
Weak 24 22 46
Total 45 45 90
Table 1
3 See Spong and
Shoenhair, “Perform-
ance of Banks,” p.
18, for more informa-
tion on the construc-
tion of peer groups.
Fifteen different peer
groups are used in
the two studies.
These peer groups re-
flect three size catego-




lion, and $500 million




each state into one of
five regions based on
geography and eco-
nomic focus.
4 The years 1988 and
1989 were chosen to
correspond to the fi-
nal two years of data
used in the Spong
and Shoenhair study.
While more recent





structure of many of
the acquired banks
and thus prevent
these banks from be-
ing compared across
more recent periods. 
5 Trend for each ac-
quired bank is mea-
sured using the
estimated slope coeffi-
cient in a simple time-
trend model of
relative returns to av-
erage assets. 
6 The other 79 banks
acquired in 1986 or




show the same pat-
tern in both 1988 and
1989 or the trend in
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22the third year after acquisition. Many of
these profitability differences, moreover,
were evident as early as the first year 
after acquisition.
7
Lending and other asset strategies
In entering new, out-of-state markets, a
key challenge facing banking organiza-
tions is developing a sound and success-
ful lending and investment strategy.
Banking organizations, for instance,
must evaluate the lending and invest-
ment policies at the banks they acquire
and begin making judgments about the
creditworthiness of existing and potential
borrowers—all without the advantage of
extensive experience in the market. In
this process, interstate organizations will
have to address such issues as the
amount of lending to undertake, types of
credit customers to pursue, policies 
regarding credit standards and asset
quality, and the overall growth in assets
at acquired banks.
One basic indicator of the acquisition
strategies of interstate organizations and
their subsequent lending policies is the
loan-to-asset ratios of the acquired banks.
Loan-to-asset ratios, for example, might
show whether an organization is acquir-
ing banks that are already strong lenders
or banks with a need for further improve-
ment. After acquisition, the loan-to-asset
ratio may reflect the ability of the bank
and its new ownership to find credit cus-
tomers. Also, because loans typically
have higher rates of return and risk than
most other banking assets, the loan-to-
asset ratio may provide insights into an
organization’s risk/return tradeoffs.
Our analysis suggests that most interstate
acquisitions that have performed well 
began with strong, established lending
Chart 1












acquisition Year after acquisition
s
earnings did not corre-
spond to the study cri-
teria. Because these
banks did not demon-
strate a clear perform-
ance trend, they are
not included in the
analysis.
 We also categorized
strong and weak per-
formance using return
on equity (ROE) as
the profitability mea-
sure. The results
were much the same
with the ROAA and
ROE measures. This
paper, though, only
presents the ROAA re-
sults, mainly because




and ROE tended to
fluctuate more from
year to year.
7 The peer bank com-
parisons presented in
the charts and tables
for this article are an
average of the differ-
ences between the in-
dividual acquired
banks and the peer
bank data. In addi-
tion, we analyzed the
median values of
these peer differ-









Strong performers 1986 acquisitions
Weak performers 1987 acquisitions
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23operations and then worked hard to
build upon this strength. At acquisition, 
the banks with strong profit performance
typically had loan-to-asset ratios above
that of their peers, and these ratios then
increased moderately after acquisition
(Chart 2). The loan-to-asset ratios of the
weak performers also increased and
stayed above that of peer banks through-
out the post-acquisition period. In fact,
the weak performers acquired in 1986
ended up with an average loan-to-asset
ratio well above peer banks and even
above that of the strong performance
groups. Strong performing interstate 
acquisitions thus appear to have occu-
pied more of a middle ground by showing
moderation in building and expanding
their lending business.
The types of loans made by the acquired
banks can also provide a picture of their
lending strategies and profit objectives.
Some organizations
believe that a strat-
egy of emphasizing
a particular type of







may prefer to develop
a more balanced or
diversified loan port-
folio. The data indi-
cate that the strong
performers gener-
ally lagged behind










as a proportion of total lending (top
panel, Table 2). However, in relation to
peer banks, only the 1986 weak perform-
ance group maintained a higher and ris-
ing commitment to real estate lending
(bottom panel, Table 2). The 1987 group
of weak performers remained below peer
banks on real estate lending, while the
strong performance groups showed an
overall decline relative to peers in this
lending category.
Commercial and industrial lending and
consumer lending typically declined as a
percent of total loans at the acquired
banks, but much of this was also a reflec-
tion of industry trends. After acquisition,
the 1986 and 1987 strong performance
groups actually showed less of a decline
in these categories compared to peer
banks. The 1986 weak performance
group made a notable shift away from
business lending during this period, while
Chart 2
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
25the 1987 weak performance group contin-
ued to do more business and consumer
lending than peer banks. Although the
success or weakness of these particular
lending strategies may be a function of
the prevailing economic conditions, the
strong performance groups appeared to
be the most successful at pursuing a 
balanced lending focus and maintaining
a credit relationship with the business
community.
Credit quality provides another indica-
tion of lending strategies, as well as the
relative success of banking organizations
in entering new markets and finding 
acceptable credit customers. In fact, at
most banks, the quality of the loan port-
folio serves as the best measure of a
bank’s management and its chances for
success. As shown in Chart 3, both the
strong and weak performance groups
began with sound loan portfolios. In the
year before acquisi-
tion, net charge-offs
were well below that




only the strong per-




stay in a favorable
position relative to
peer banks. Loan




and, in most cases,
were much worse
than peer levels by
the second and





success of an inter-
state acquisition clearly hinges on main-
taining a sound loan portfolio. While
such numbers do not provide insights
into what steps the acquired banks took
in assessing creditworthiness, the credit
quality record of the strong performance
groups may be due, in part, to the grad-
ual approach these banks took in adjusting
their loan-to-asset ratios and lending focus.
The growth in assets at acquired banks
may provide additional evidence on inter-
state acquisition strategies and perform-
ance. Interstate organizations are likely
to favor attractive, growing markets and
banks with good prospects for expan-
sion. After entry into a new market, asset
growth may be a good test of an organiza-
tion’s product line, marketing skills, and
competitiveness. Many organizations
also view growth as a means of overcom-
ing much of the dilution in earnings per
share associated with acquisitions. At
Chart 3
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26the same time,
rapid growth may
be a real challenge
to the management










tive to peer banks
often fare poorly in
generating profits.











Among the strong performers, asset
growth was at a moderate, steady pace,
both before and after acquisition. Thus,
while growth may be important in estab-
lishing a market presence and eliminat-
ing earnings dilution, excessive growth
could hurt profitability by leading to a 
deterioration in asset quality or by inhib-
iting control of overhead.
Changes to income and expenses
Strong profit performance in a new mar-
ket will also depend upon the ability of
bank management to pursue appropriate
strategies with respect to pricing of loans
and deposits, developing sources of non-
interest income, and controlling expenses.
Each of these strategies clearly repre-
sents a challenge for interstate banking
organizations as they adjust to the com-
petitive structure of the markets they
enter and as they establish banking opera-
tions and policies. One way to examine
these characteristics and strategies of
acquired banks is to divide bank earn-
ings into four basic income and expense
components: net interest income, nonin-
terest income, overhead expenses, and
net other income and expenses. As a
comprehensive measure of income, these
components will thus provide a picture
of the differences between strong and
weak performers in generating income.
This earnings relationship can be 
expressed as:
ROAA = (net interest income/average assets)
+ (noninterest income/average assets)
– (overhead/average assets)
+ (net other income and expenses/
average assets)
Chart 4
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27In the year before acquisition, the values
for these four components are similar for
the strong and weak performance groups
(Table 3), reflecting the fact that ROAA
was similar for each group. By 1989,
however, the levels of each of the four
components had changed in a fashion
that led to a much higher ROAA for the
strong performers. For example, the
value in 1989 for net interest income
relative to average assets was 4.27 per-
cent for the 1986 strong performance
group, which greatly exceeded the 3.64
percent earned by the 1986 weak per-
formance group. Changes in overhead
also favored the strong performance
groups and helped contribute to their
large earnings advantage in 1989.
Which of the four components contrib-
uted most to the widening of the profit
gap? This question can be answered by
analyzing the changes in ROAA and its
components across the strong and weak
performance groups.
Analysis of these
changes shows that the
two most important fac-
tors were overhead and
net interest income (see
the Appendix for this
analysis). 
Control of overhead is a
key objective cited in
many acquisition plans.
Also, active bank ac-
quirers typically count
on expense control to
make up a notable por-
tion of the earnings di-
lution encountered in
an acquisition. To con-
trol overhead, an ac-
quirer could pursue a
strategy of purchasing
a bank with above aver-
age levels of overhead
and then trying to im-
prove its productivity.
Another strategy would
be to purchase a bank
with an established record of overhead
control and implement policies that
build upon that record.
The strong performance groups began
with overhead-to-average asset ratios 
below that of peer banks, thus indicating
a preference by many interstate organiza-
tions to acquire banks that have already
demonstrated a good record of cost con-
trol. As shown in Table 3, the strong per-
formers continued to make progress on
reducing overhead, and this pattern also
was evident in comparisons with peer
banks.
9 In contrast, the overhead-to-
asset ratio of weak performers, after a
small initial dip, rose to levels much
higher than that of the strong performers. 
Other measures of expenses and produc-
tivity show similar trends. Average assets
per employee rose for strong performers
in a fashion not matched by weak per-
formers (Chart 5). Personnel expense as
9 These peer bank
comparisons are not
included in the paper,
but are available
upon request from the
authors. The other
comparisons men-
tioned in this section,
but not presented in
the tables or charts,
can be obtained upon
request.
Components of ROAA for strong and weak performers, 
year before acquisition and 1989





Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak
ROAA 1.02% .96% 1.27% -.11% 1.00% .95% 1.42% .39%
Net interest income/
average assets 4.35 4.32 4.27 3.64 3.76 3.75 4.17 3.78
Noninterest income/
average assets .84 .91 1.08 .92 .80 .73 .84 .80
Overhead/
average assets 3.59 3.70 3.22 3.89 2.98 3.06 2.84 3.46
Net other income and 
expense/average assets -.58 -.58 -.86 -.78 -.58 -.47 -.75 -.73
Table 3
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28a percentage of oper-
ating income and





ers. As a result, con-
trol of expenses
would appear to be






ately is also crucial
to strong profit per-
formance. Under-
pricing or over-




to generate a desir-
able level of busi-
ness and type of
customer. In the 
acquired banks, maintenance of net in-
terest income was important to success—
a result that can be investigated more
closely by looking at two determinants of
net interest income, the net interest mar-
gin and the earning asset ratio. This rela-
tionship can be expressed as:
(net interest income/average assets) 
= (net interest income/average earning 
assets) ´ (average earning assets/
average assets)
= net interest margin ´ earning asset ratio.
For the acquired banks, the earning asset
ratio showed a similar rising trend for
both the weak and strong performance
groups. Net interest margin, however,
moved decisively in favor of the strong
performance groups. Consequently, the
ability of strong performers to maintain
net interest margins was another major
factor in their earnings success.
The other earnings components, nonin-
terest income and net other income and
expenses, played far less of a role in the
divergent profit trends of weak and
strong performers (Appendix). In recent
years, developing noninterest sources of
income has been a strategy many have
suggested for achieving superior profit
performance. Yet there is some recogni-
tion that much of the market for fee-
based bank services is highly  competitive,
and profitability is proving more elusive
than expected in many of the new fee-
generating activities in banking. Overall,
changes in noninterest income led to a
wider gap in profitability between strong
and weak performers only for the 1986
acquisition group. In a similar manner,
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29make a consistent contribution to the
trends in profitability.
Acquisition factors: Purchase price
and geographic distance
In addition to asset and earnings strategies,
a number of acquisition considerations
could have an effect on the performance
of the acquired banks. Two such consid-
erations are the price paid for an inter-
state acquisition and the location of an
acquired bank in relation to its affiliated
banks and interstate parent.
The price of an acquisition is a very im-
portant factor in judging successful per-
formance. This price not only reflects the
strategies of the acquiring organization,
but also incorporates a number of assump-
tions about the attractiveness and future
performance of an acquired bank. Inter-
state organizations that pay higher
prices for acquisitions typically base
these prices on such factors as a bank’s
superior earnings record, excellent pros-
pects, strategic importance, and attrac-
tive location. As a result, a very strong
post-acquisition performance may be
necessary to justify such prices and pre-
vent earnings dilution for existing stock-
holders. Other organizations, though,
may be more averse to the earnings dilu-
tion and other risks associated with high
purchase premiums and may be more
willing to look at a wider range of acquisi-
tions. The success of these different
strategies will therefore depend on how
closely the prices paid for acquisitions 
relate to subsequent performance.
10
For the acquired banks, acquisition price
does not show a close relationship to
profit performance (Table 4). When ROAA
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1986 Strong 2.25 (15) 2.29 (14)
Weak 2.29 (17) 2.26 (14)
1987 Strong 2.09 (14) 2.15 (15)
Weak 2.25   (9) 1.86  (12)
* Number of observations are in parentheses. The number of observations is less than the number of banks in our study because many
sample banks were acquired in the sale of a bank holding company, and so the same purchase price would apply to several sample
banks. In these cases, the surviving banks from a particular acquisition were consolidated for each year in the sample period, and the
performance category was based on the consolidated results.
Also, some observations represented several original acquisitions that were subsequently merged during the sample period. The price-
to-book values for each of the original acquisitions were combined into a weighted price-to-book value, with the weights 
determined by the proportion of the original acquisitions book value relative to the total book value of the merged institution. 
Table 4
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30The statistical patterns presented in this article could be attained using a variety of policies. To
illustrate some specific policies and circumstances that led to differing performance results,
this side box presents similarities and differences between the management of interstate acqui-
sitions by First Union Corporation, Charlotte, North Carolina, and Banc One Corporation,
Columbus, Ohio. The discussion incorporates both performance numbers and comments by
each company’s management and by others on acquisition strategies and policy decisions.
First Union and Banc One serve as useful case studies because they had extensive experience
with interstate acquisitions (they were among the most active acquirers in our sample), and 
because clear differences exist in the performance of their interstate acquisitions in this study.
At the end of 1989, 9.7 percent of the assets of the First Union sample banks were in the strong
performance category, 29.7 percent were in weak performers, and the remaining assets were in
banks with a mixed performance record. Conversely, 79 percent of the assets of the Banc One
sample banks were in strong performers, and 11.6 percent were in the weak category.
Articles in the financial press report many policies toward management and acquisitions that
were similar at First Union and Banc One. Both sought friendly merger partners, and generally
retained the employees of acquired organizations to take advantage of ties to the local commu-
nity. Both looked to acquire small-to-medium size banks in familiar, nearby markets. Given
their well-developed product lines, First Union and Banc One expected to enhance profitability
by selling an expanded line of services to customers at the newly acquired banks. Both organiza-
tions allowed local autonomy concerning matters of product delivery and pricing. Finally, both
First Union and Banc One economized by centralizing common operations, such as data proc-
essing, product development, and marketing.
While many similarities existed between the two organizations, significant differences also were
apparent. All of First Union’s weak performing acquisitions were located in Georgia, and unan-
ticipated asset quality problems characterized some of these acquisitions. As a result of this 
experience, First Union altered its acquisition strategy by increasing due-diligence reviews to more
closely measure its credit exposure from new acquisitions.
1 Asset problems, however, were not
the only drag on First Union’s operations in Georgia. Reports suggest that First Union sacri-
ficed margins on loans to increase loan volume.2 Our data also indicates an aggressive lending
strategy: the combined loan-to-asset ratio for First Union’s acquisitions in Georgia rose to 72
percent at the end of 1989, while the average for peer banks was only 61 percent.
In addition, analysts believe that some Georgia acquisitions had management styles that did
not mesh with that of First Union. For example, First Railroad and Banking Company of Geor-
gia reportedly had a decentralized management structure when it was acquired by First Union. 
1 Saul Hansell, “How North Carolina Became America’s Banking Capital,” Institutional Investor, November
1991, p. 108.
2 Steve Bergsman, “The Fastest Checkbook in Banking,” Bankers Monthly, January 1990, p.28
Box: The Performance of the Interstate Acquisitions of First Union and Banc One
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31As a result, First Union was forced to devote considerable time and effort into building a man-
agement team at First Railroad that was compatible with its own management structure.
3 
Perhaps the best summary of First Union’s troubles with its Georgia acquisitions is their
combined overhead-to-average assets ratio: this ratio was 26 percent above the peer average
by the end of 1989.
Bank One generally did not suffer such difficulties in most of its interstate acquisitions. It 
increased lending, but avoided asset quality problems in its merger partners by imposing high
credit standards. Banc One’s marketing strategy emphasized earnings, and by 1989 it had achieved
a net interest margin in its strong performing interstate acquisitions that averaged 20 percent
above peer. Banc One accomplished this by selling a set of high-margin products, such as
credit cards, student loans, and indirect automobile financing. For example, a Banc One acqui-
sition in 1988, Wisconsin-based Marine Corporation, had no previous experience with indirect
automobile financing. But upon acquisition, it was able to start this type of lending quickly, and
within three years controlled 50 percent of that market in the greater Milwaukee area. Finally,
Banc One’s acquisition strategy largely avoided post-merger management conflicts by including
a thorough investigation of a potential acquisition’s management. Banks were acquired only if
their management philosophy was compatible with that of Banc One.
The policies that Banc One implemented in its strong performing interstate acquisitions corre-
sponded to many of the high-performance characteristics identified in this article: moderate 
expansion of loans, quality lending, emphasis on earnings, and expense control. First Union’s
policies, no doubt, aimed at achieving similar results, and it achieved these goals in some of its
interstate acquisitions. But for its Georgia acquisitions, analysts suggest that First Union’s 
acquisition and loan growth strategies led to managerial complications and asset quality prob-
lems, and caused poor performance that persisted several years after acquisition. These exam-
ples thus suggest another trait of successful interstate organizations—they do a comprehensive job
of planning and completing acquisitions, but remain ready to correct deficiencies in their strate-
gies and to adapt policies to changing circumstances.
3 Bergman, “The Fastest Checkbook in Banking,” p. 29.
Additional sources: “Banc One’s Tactics for Excellence,” The Bankers Magazine, September/October 1991.
pp. 7-13; Steve Cocheo, “What’s So Good About Banc One?,” ABA Banking Journal, July 1991, pp. 54+;
Jeanne Dugan Cooper, “First Union Plans Big Cuts at Florida Unit,” American Banker, August 16, 1989, 
p. 1; Timothy J. Harris, “The Ten Best Profit Margins in Banking,” Bankers Monthly, April 1988, pp. 61-8;
Christopher K. Heaney, “When Ed Crutchfield Talks, Bankers Listen,” ABA Banking Journal, April 1987, pp.
29-31; Rahul Jacob, “Banking’s Best Acquirer: Banc One’s John McCoy,” Fortune, July 29, 1991, 
p. 106; Yvette D. Kantrow, “First Union, PNC Establish Cost-Cutting Pattern in Acquisitions,” American
Banker, December 7, 1988, p. 39; “Nothing Could be Finer, To Bank in Carolina,” The Economist, March 26,
1988, pp. 23-5; Joseph F. Sanchez and Keven Stiroh, “Banc One Mines Synergies in Wisconsin,” American
Banker, September 26, 1990, p. 16; J. Christopher Svare, “Acquiring for Growth and Profit:  The Banc One
Experience,” Bank Management, November 1990, pp. 18-24;  Robert Teitelman, “The Magnificent McCoys:
Running America’s Best Bank,” Institutional Investor, July 1991, pp. 47-56.  
Box: The Performance of the Interstate Acquisitions of First Union and Banc One (continued)
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32is the performance measure, banks in
the strong performance group were typi-
cally acquired at slightly lower prices
than weaker banks. When performance
is measured by return on equity, a mea-
sure more reflective of stockholder inter-
ests, strong performers carry somewhat
higher prices. These price differences,
though, do not appear great enough to
explain the differences in earnings 
between the strong and weak banks.
Thus, the acquisition price data implies
that weak performance generally is not
being offset or explained by substantially
lower acquisition prices. Many success-
ful organizations, in fact, appear to be
achieving their results without paying
any more for acquisitions than others
are paying.
The geographic distance between an 
acquisition and its new parent is another
factor that could conceivably influence
performance. A strategy of acquiring
banks in close proximity to the parent 
organization may make expense control
easier, facilitate more direct oversight of
operations, and allow more centraliza-
tion of back office operations. Also, close-
ness may help ensure that interstate
organizations are more familiar with the
markets and customers of the acquired
banks, as well as many of the competing
institutions. Overall, these factors would
appear to explain much of the growth in
regional banking organizations over the
last decade and the development of 
regional interstate entry laws. In addi-
tion, several studies have found some
support for this link between close prox-
imity and better performance by acquired
banks.
11
On the other hand, closeness is no guar-
antee of success, and improvements in
communications and the availability of
information may allow distant operations
to be conducted without significant prob-
lems. In addition, organizations that 
focus largely on nearby acquisitions and
communities may greatly limit their 
opportunities for diversifying risk and for
finding the most attractive markets and
acquisition candidates.
As shown in Table 5, an increase in the
distance between an interstate acquisi-
tion and the lead bank of the parent 
organization does not appear to have had
an adverse effect on performance. In fact,
the acquired banks in the weak perform-
ance groups were actually located closer
to the lead bank of their interstate par-
ents than the strong performers. Thus,
while the typical interstate acquisition
was within several hundred miles of the
parent organization and its lead bank, 
acquisitions at greater distances were
not at a disadvantage and, on average,
performed better.
Conclusion
A number of interstate acquisitions have
established a strong, upward trend in
performance, while others have suffered
through a deterioration in earnings. If
these acquisitions and their divergent
paths are a useful guide, the following
strategies and characteristics should be
of interest to interstate organizations seek-
ing a proven path to successful operations:
11 Center for Banking
Issues and Strate-
gies, Analyzing Suc-





tute, 1990), pp. 40-44.
Distance of bank holding company’s lead bank 







Average distance in miles
1986 Strong 300 341
Weak 262 276
1987 Strong 522 478
Weak 204 224
Table 5
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33· Acquire banks that have a strong pres-
ence in their loan markets and work
to maintain this position by pursuing
moderate loan growth
· Continue to emphasize the traditional
business and consumer lending roles
of banks and be cautious about any
shifts into higher-risk lending categories
· Establish high credit standards and
do not sacrifice credit quality to ex-
pand the loan portfolio
· Stress earnings rather than asset
growth—maintain net interest mar-
gins and improve but do not place too
much reliance on noninterest income
· When possible, acquire banks that are
already good at controlling expenses,
and work towards lowering overhead
through productivity improvements
· Do not assume that high acquisition
prices and nearby acquisitions will
guarantee success
In summary, these strategies and charac-
teristics suggest that the most important
factor in the success of an interstate 
acquisition will be an organization’s man-
agement skills. The strong performing 
acquisitions in this study, for instance,
could be characterized as having manage-
ment that carefully followed a compre-
hensive set of strategies, while also
demonstrating mastery of many critical
banking skills. With interstate banking,
moreover, an added challenge for man-
agement is to perform these tasks in new
markets where previous experience and
detailed insights into customers and
competitors are limited.
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34The data presented in Table 3 show the changes in the four components of ROAA that
served to distinguish strong from weak performers. Determining which of these four
components contributed most to the differences in ROAA requires two steps. The first
step is to calculate the differences in ROAA and its components between the strong
and weak performance groups. The second step is to calculate the change in this dif-
ference or gap over the period covered by this study. Because this change in the
ROAA gap will be equal to the sum of the corresponding changes for the four earnings
components, these changes will provide a measure of the relative contribution of each
component. 
The following symbols and definitions will simplify presentation of the analysis:
AA= average assets
NII= net interest income
NonII= noninterest income
ROAA = return on average assets
OH= overhead
NOTH= net other income and expenses (taxes, extraordinary items, or provisions)
The equation given in the text can be written as
ROAA = (NII/AA) + (NonII/AA) - (OH/AA) + (NOTH/AA)
Let the subscript GAP serve as notation to indicate the difference between values for
strong and weak performers during a particular year:
12 
ROAAGAP = (NII/AA)GAP + (NonII/AA)GAP – (OH/AA)GAP + (NOTH/AA)GAP
Table A shows the calculated gaps for ROAA and its components for the year before
acquisition and for the final year of analysis, 1989. For example, average ROAA for
the 1986 strong and weak performers was 1.02 and 0.96 percent, respectively, in the
year before acquisition (Table 3), thus giving strong performers a profit advantage or
“gap” of only 0.06 points (Table A). As shown in the first column of Table A, this gap
reflects an advantage held by strong performers in net interest income relative to aver-
age assets (NII/AA) and overhead relative to average assets (OH/AA). The advantage
was partially offset by a negative gap for noninterest income relative to average assets
(NonII/AA). Both groups had the same level of net other income and expenses relative
to average assets (NOTH/AA).
By 1989, the average difference or gap in profits between the 1986 strong and weak
acquisition groups had widened to 1.38 percent of average assets, reflecting the 
advantage strong performers held in three of the four earnings components (Column
2 of Table A).
Appendix:  Analysis of the Profit Gap
12 If we let subscripts S and W denote strong and weak, then ROAAGAP = ROAAS - ROAAW, (NII/AA)GAP  =
(NII/AA)S - (NII/AA)W, and so on. 
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35Since the difference in ROAA between strong and weak performers rose from 0.06 per-
cent in the year before acquisition to 1.38 percent in 1989, the net change in this gap
was 1.32 percentage points (Column 3 of Table A).
13 The single most important earnings
component contributing to this change was net interest income relative to average as-
sets, which was responsible for 0.60 of the 1.32 percentage point change in the ROAA
gap. This was followed closely by overhead relative to average assets with a contribution
of 0.56, and then by noninterest income relative to average assets (0.23 of the 1.32 per-
centage point change). The change in net other income and expenses had a small, but
negative impact on the ROAA gap. 
The right panel of Table A presents a similar analysis for the 1987 acquisition group. In
the year before acquisition, strong performers had an ROAA that was only .05 percent-
age points higher than that for the weak performers, but this earnings gap rose to 1.03
percentage points by 1989. The change in the profit gap was thus 0.98 points. For the
1987 acquisitions, the single most important component in the earnings change was
overhead relative to average assets, which provided 0.54 of the 0.98 percentage point
change. Net interest income relative to average assets also contributed to the change in
the profit gap (0.38 of the 0.98 percentage point change), but its contribution was some-
what smaller than that for the 1986 acquisition group. Noninterest income relative to 
average assets made a negative contribution to the change in the earnings gap (-0.03
compared to 0.98), thus indicating that weak performers actually closed the gap on this
component. Net other income and expenses had a small positive effect on the change in
the profit gap.
To summarize, the most important components in explaining the differences in ROAA
trends for the strong and weak profit performers were net interest income and overhead.
A somewhat distant third component was noninterest income. Consequently, key strate-
gies in successful acquisitions would appear to be generating a good volume of earning
assets, pricing loans and deposits appropriately, and controlling expenses.
In addition, a similar analysis was made using the values of ROAA and its components
relative to peer banks. Net interest margin and overhead were again the most important
factors in the change in the profit gap. Noninterest income also played a quantitatively
important role for the 1986 acquisition group. The net other income and expenses com-
ponent was small but not negligible in importance in this peer analysis. This component
moved against the weak performers in both acquisition groups, most likely due to the 
asset quality problems these banks encountered and the resulting need for larger provi-
sions for loan losses.
13 In mathematical terms, let the change of the ROAA gap be represented by D ROAAGAP, where
D ROAAGAP = ROAA GAP
1989  - ROAA GAP
YBA.
The superscripts refer to the period of the observation, either 1989 or the year before acquisition (YBA). Using 
similar notation for the components of ROAA, we can find 
D ROAAGAP = D NII/AAGAP + D NonII /AAGAP - D OH/AAGAP + D NOTH/AAGAP.
That is, the change of the ROAA gap is the sum of the change of each of the four components of ROAA.
Appendix:  Analysis of the Profit Gap (continued)
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36Factors behind the profit differences between strong 
and weak performers
1986 acquisitions 1987 acquisitions














ROAA .06% 1.38%  1.32% .05% 1.03% .98%
Net interest income/
average assets .03 .63  .60 .01 .39 .38
Noninterest income/
average assets -.07 .16  .23 .07 .04 -.03
Overhead/average 
assets* .11 .67  .56 .08 .62 .54
Net other income
and expense/average
assets .00 -.08  -.08 -.11 -.02 .09
* The strong performance groups had average values of overhead/average assets that were lower than that for the weak
performance groups. The gap is reported as a positive number in this table because overhead is an expense item, and so the gap
would have a positive contribution to ROAA.
Table A
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